Free DNS Record Lookup + SPF, DMARC & DKIM Email Auth Checker
See every record for a domain, and check SPF, DMARC and DKIM before your mail lands in spam.
Free · No signupQueried from your browser
DNS record lookup
Records
A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, TXT, CAA, SOA and HTTPS, with TTLs and where mail is hosted.
Email security
SPF with every include counted against the 10-lookup limit, DMARC policy and DKIM keys.
Compare resolvers
Cloudflare and Google side by side, to see whether a change has spread.
Only the names you look up go to Cloudflare’s public resolver, or Google’s as a fallback. Nothing reaches CtrlOps.
From the records to the server
Run the servers these records point to.
Connect over SSH, watch health and deploy apps on every server, all from one desktop workspace.
Keep it handy
Record types,
at a glance.
The records a lookup returns, what each one holds, and what a typical value looks like.
| Type | Holds | Example |
|---|---|---|
A | IPv4 addresses for the name | 93.184.215.14 |
AAAA | IPv6 addresses for the name | 2606:2800:21f:cb07::1 |
CNAME | An alias to another name, which answers instead | www → example.netlify.app |
MX | The servers that receive mail, lowest number first | 10 mx1.example.com |
NS | The name servers that hold the zone | ns1.cloudflare.com |
TXT | Free text: SPF, DMARC, DKIM keys and site verification | v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com -all |
CAA | The certificate authorities allowed to issue for the name | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" |
SOA | The zone’s primary server, admin contact and serial | ns1.example.com 2026102101 |
PTR | The name for an IP address (reverse DNS) | 1.1.1.1 → one.one.one.one |
How the checks work
Records first.
Then the mail.
Real answers, straight from public DNS
Your browser asks Cloudflare’s DNS-over-HTTPS resolver directly, and Google’s if Cloudflare cannot be reached. A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, TXT, CAA, SOA and HTTPS are fetched together, with each record’s TTL, and every mail server is resolved to check it has an address. A subdomain is looked up as written, and a CNAME is followed to the name that actually answers.
SPF counted the way receivers count it
SPF allows 10 DNS lookups. Every include, a, mx, ptr and exists term costs one, and includes nest, so the checker walks the whole tree and counts the worst case, as RFC 7208 tells receivers to. It also counts lookups that return nothing, which RFC 7208 limits to two, and flags +all, a missing all and the deprecated ptr.
DMARC and DKIM, with what to change
DMARC is read from _dmarc, falling back to the parent domain’s sp= policy for a subdomain, then checked for a real policy and a report address. DKIM keys are looked for under about 20 selectors that common providers use, plus yours, and each key’s size is estimated so weak 1024-bit keys stand out. Every problem says what to publish instead.
Compare resolvers after a change
After you edit a record, resolvers keep the old answer until its TTL runs out. Compare resolvers asks Cloudflare and Google the same questions and marks every answer that differs, so you can see whether the change has spread or is still cached.
Read RFC 7208, the SPF specificationCommon questions
DNS and email,
explained.
The most common cause is SPF exceeding the 10 DNS-lookup limit in RFC 7208, which makes receivers treat SPF as a permerror. Another is a weak DMARC policy or a missing DKIM signature. Enter your domain here: the tool counts your real SPF lookups (following nested includes), grades DMARC, and probes for DKIM keys, so you can see which of the three is failing.
Ten. Each include, a, mx, ptr, and exists mechanism, plus the redirect modifier, counts as one lookup, and includes nest so the total adds up fast. Over ten and SPF returns permerror. This checker resolves your includes recursively and reports the true count, warning you at eight so you have room to spare.
A selector is the label that points to a specific DKIM public key at <selector>._domainkey.yourdomain. Providers pick their own: Google Workspace uses "google", Microsoft 365 uses "selector1" and "selector2", Mailchimp uses "k1". To find yours, open the raw headers of an email you sent and look for DKIM-Signature with s=<selector>. This tool also auto-probes about 20 common selectors, and you can type a known one in the DKIM selector field.
p=none is monitor-only: it requests reports without asking receivers to quarantine or reject messages that fail DMARC. Use it to discover your legitimate senders via aggregate (rua) reports, then move to p=quarantine and finally p=reject once legitimate mail passes. Receivers can still apply their own spam and delivery policies. The tool flags p=none as a warning for this reason.
Both request action on mail that fails DMARC, meaning neither SPF nor DKIM passes with alignment to the visible From domain. Quarantine asks the receiver to treat it as suspicious, usually sending it to spam or junk; reject asks the receiver to refuse it. Receiver policies can affect the final action. Move to reject once you are confident legitimate mail passes.
No. The lookups run entirely from your browser using DNS-over-HTTPS to Cloudflare, with Google as a fallback. Only the domain name you enter is sent to that public resolver, never to a CtrlOps server, and no email content is involved. You can verify this in your browser network tab.
Yes. The tool probes around 20 of the most common provider selectors automatically, so for most mainstream mail providers a key is found without any input. If your provider uses a custom selector, enter it in the DKIM selector field and the tool will query it directly. No result does not prove DKIM is missing - only that none of the probed selectors matched.
A null MX (a single MX record with priority 0 and a "." host, per RFC 7505) explicitly declares that a domain does not receive email. It is the correct configuration for a domain used only for a website. The tool detects and labels it so you are not misled into thinking mail is misconfigured.
The "all" mechanism sets the default result for senders not otherwise listed. +all passes everyone, which authorizes any server on the internet to send mail as your domain - it disables SPF completely. Use -all for a hard fail (recommended) or ~all for a soft fail. The tool flags +all as a hard error.
DNSSEC cryptographically signs DNS data so validating resolvers can detect tampering. When the resolver returns the Authenticated Data flag, the tool shows DNSSEC validation in the summary. An answer without that flag is not necessarily invalid: the domain may be unsigned, or validation may not be available.
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